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What are borders? Of the many definitions possible, the one closest to this 
approach is that of borders as formal delimitations between collective subjective 
entities - identities in the fortunate cases - politically organized in states or 
equivalents. As such, the:ir impoftance is twofold: political, as they stand as 
protectors of one given set of laws and regulations, and not another; symbolical, 
as they also guard certain customs aod norms, therefore cultural identity. Both 
accomplishments make borders indispensable, as collectivities cannot do 
without some identity, albeit conventional: cultural anomie is unhealthful. Yet in 
both endeavors borders are vulnerable and increasingly harder to sustain in 
times of unprecedented movement of ideas, people and capitals. 
The 1999 Helsinki summit of the EU took the historical decision to set ao 
Eastern border to Europe. It included the Baltic States, Turkey, two Balkan 
countries - Romania and Bulgaria - and left out Ukraine, Serbia, Moldova and 
others, with more or less similar legitimate claims and assumed identities. As the 
decision was taken in the aftermath of the Kosovo war, the border could not 
have looked different. Nevertheless, this historical decision seems to follow the 
blueprint of the most importaot Europeao policies in the last decade of the 20" 
century, the crafting of nowadays policies on yesterday's shabby forecasts, be 
they the prolongation of the Cold War or the survival in power of the Milosevic 
dynasty into the 21st century. Given the benefit of hindsight, one cannot fail to 
notice some considerable inertia as a main driving force behind the signing of 
the Europeao Maastricht Treaty or the EMU: but neither cao one deny the 
exceptional significance of such decisions, regardless of the:ir initial motivation. 
For some states of Eastern Europe, Helsinki was the best news in a century 
otherwise quite poor in historical opportunities. But maoy are still to be done to 
turn this conventional border drawn on a map in Brussels into a border of 
Europe, even assuming the target set is the right one. Challenges to the Eastern 
border of Europe are tremendous, and policies of enlargement may well stop 
short of securing what Europe was out seeking in the first place, peace, security 
and prosperity on the Eastern border. 
This paper will review these challenges taking a political aoalysis 
approach rather thao a technical, policy bound one. The latter would discuss 
Justice and Home Affairs acquis, cross-border police cooperation, and so forth, 
breaking down item by item the two main challenges: the geographical 
terrestrial border to the East aod the 'wealth' border, the difference in income 
between Western and Eastern Europe. I will take a broader approach, however: 
challenges are rooted as much in policies' design as in the:ir implementation, so 
from the Brussels policy planning cabinets to the Eastern outskirts of the vast 
European empire, border posts and Consulates directly facing the 'desert of 
tartars' 1, one can try to cast a fresh look. Change is said to come only 
incrementally to huge organizations, but understanding can be occasionally 
unleashed. Still, understanding is culturally-bounded: of the scenarios for 
Enrope released by the Forward Studies Unit in 1999 none was actually 
foreseeing Helsinki at some close range, and only one displayed some trust in 
classic liberal democracy to endure in the 21st century on the basis of successful 
markets, all the others being more or less disguises of post 1968 post-matetialist 
ideologies. If the rate of forecast writers is of one free-marketer to four post-
materialists, or of one Euro-optimist to four Euro-pessimists the future seems 
gilm indeed. 
Ideas are therefore as important as facts: this is the underlying assumption 
guiding this policy analysis. Consequentially, this paper is structured on the 
discussion of six essential ideas relevant to the enlargement policies and the 
Eastern border topic, and the challenge of common wisdom on those. This 
should not be read, however, as this author would somehow be in the possession 
of some alternative source of wisdom, or that such alternative wisdom even 
exists somewhere: instead, it should be viewed as a programmatic attempt of 
some 'mise en abime' exercise, of putting into the abyss of our common 
assumptions, hoping that unconventional discussion will foster our more 
advanced understanding. As such, I shall discuss policy options in the light of 
these widespread assumptions and their challenge to reach in the end a few 
recommendations. 
Is Eastern European borders 'goodness-of-fit' comparable to the Western 
European one? 
State borders may seem at the first sight to be granted similar significance 
throughout the continent of Europe as main symbols of national sovereignty. 
One estimate is that 8,000 miles of new state borders have been created in 
Central and Eastern Enrope since 1989 alone. The brutal, be it peaceful 
(Czechoslovakia) or non-peaceful (Yugoslavia) redrawing of frontiers within 
Eastern Europe frightened the Western world after 1989: but it was a mere 
revenge on a century of frustration over the inability to find the 'right' borders, 
the expression of what a political scientist labeled as 'unfinished national 
revolutions'2 • All borders may be conventional, but some are more conventional 
than others, and Eastern European borders after the liberation wars that have 
started in the second half of the 19thcentury and ended with the Versailles Treaty 
in 1919 resemble to some extent more with African post-colonial borders than 
1 The expression is, of course, the title of a Dino Buzatti famous novel. The hero guards a 
border facing a desert and spends his lifetime waiting for the threat to the borders- 'the 
tartars'- to materialize. 
2 Philip Roeder 1999. 
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Western European ones. The character of Eastern Europe as a 'colony', unable 
to pursue a normal development path due to chronic foreign domination and 
intervention by the entities designed under the name of 'the Great Powers' is 
rarely acknowledged nowadays, and for some regions such as the Balkans, even 
its negative consequences are disputed (Todorova 1997, 184-188). Nonetheless, 
the e-ssential variable that prevented no:r:tD:ar-State· formation in Eastern Europe 
and led to the impossible patchwork we face today is the confiscation of natural 
national, developments by centuries of foreign domination and /or intervention. 
Nowhere and at no times were nation-states built without violence: the 
idealization of Western European state and nation building only leads to flawed 
categories of nationalism. Centuries of combined ethnic and religious cleansing, 
conversion and negotiation lead to Western European nations within the Euro-
Atlantic region, what Gellner (1994) labeled once the first and second time-
zones of Europe'. In the third time-zone, roughly the enlargement countries of 
nowadays, this evolution was prevented by the zone being a playground not for 
God, as the title of a contemporary history of Poland proclaims3, but for the 
Ottoman, Habsbnrg and Russian empires. The most influential set of 
classifications of nationalism as Western civic, Eastern ethnic (Kahn 1965; 
Gellner 1994) is reducible in fact to 'Western good, Eastern bad' and fully based 
on the lack of acknowledgement of two essential phenomena: national under-
development of Eastern Europe due to foreign occupation, and civic liberal 
models, not German romanticism, as the initial dominant paradigm of 19th 
Century East European state-building (Sugar 1980). A much more refined, 
therefore accurate point of view is present in nationalism literature (Sugar 1980; 
Greenfeld 1991; Roeder 1999) but as it is often the case with more complex, less 
black-and-white classifications this has never mattered for policy. Western 
European borders were, one must acknowledge, rendered a lot more 'natural' 
through centuries of evolution. Their superimposition on the natural frontiers. of 
'social communication' 4 set by common or close languages reached a high 
degree of 'goodness-of-fit'. Where it did not, as in the case of borders between 
France and Germany a revolutionary process of unification of Europe was 
needed to solve the matter. But nowadays, indeed, on average less than a third of 
West Europeans consider their borders 'wrong', and the figure decreased even 
more after the unification of the two German states. In Eastern Europe, 
however, the situation could not be more different: on the average, a majority of 
East Europeans are not settled with their borders, and three polls (Times-Mirror-
19915; Heywood, Miller and Whitel998; Mungiu-Pippidi 2000b) found high 
rates of agreement with the statement ". Unsurprisingly labeled by Heywood, 
Miller and White as 'external nationalism', this variable may actually measure 
the awareness of perceived historical 'lack-of-fit' of national borders to national 
3 Davies 1984 
4 Karl Deutsch 1953 
5 Reported in Klaus van Beyme 1996. 
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cultures than nationalism per se. Accepting cultural minorities within one's 
national borders is manageable: accepting in the same time that one's own 
ethnic group makes a minority or even a majority in a neighboring state 
(Kosovo, Moldova) while one's minorities are in the same position towards 
other neighboring states reaches the point where one has to accept that borders 
are entirely, not partly conventional, and as such are purely meaningless entitie~. 
The perception of Eastern Europeans that something is wrong about therr 
borders is therefore somehow grounded in reality; this does not imply, however, 
that a better set of borders could have been produced when centuries of 
umiatural evolution had to be brought overnight to an equitable and workable 
solution. This also does not imply that the perception in itself of borders as 
\VTong does not generate territorial nationalisni. It does. Hungary, for instance, 
leads in the top of external nationalism of the countries polled, despite 
Hungarians from abroad being high on the list of the most disliked groups in 
Hungary (Heywood, White and Miller 1998). In the Freedom House survey 
Romanians show a close match to Hungarians dissatisfaction with borders, and 
share as well the distaste of eo-nationals living in surrounding countries, 
especially Moldovans (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2000). This shows that historical 
inemories, more than contemporary feelings of sohdanty grounded m common 
identity feed territorial nationalism6• 
Figure 1. Territorial nationalism in selected European countries 
UK D DDR cz HU PL BU RUS UKR u RO 
There are pans of 
other countries which 20 43 25 39 68 60 52 22 24 46 71 belono to us 
Source. Times M1rror S y, 
"'" 
1991· Freedom House-SAR, 2000 
If that is the proble111, what is the solution? Most Eastern European borders are 
closer to the France-Germany model than to the ordinary West-European border, 
so th~ plain solution that these borders must be rendered superfluous via a 
process of unification (although it was not speci~cally stated as. such at 
Copenhagen or Helsinki) is the wise one. But three senous problems anse here: 
i. The most difficult borders lie not within the enlargement area; after all, 
Hungary, which has the largest minorities in surrounding countries wo~ld not 
dream of waging war against Slovakia or Romania to recuperate some of 1ts pre-
6 It seems that self-esteem is bolstered by the idea of a Greater Hungary or a Greater Romania: 
we dream of a greater collective self, but of a rather abstract one, inhabitants of these alienated 
territories beincr seen as second-rank nationals. However the utility of a 'Greater' country in the 
historical past~ a bolsterer of self-esteem is accountable ~or citizens being on_ the average still 
interested in history in times and regions where the educauon system faces senous problems to 
teach anyone anything. 
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1918 territories. The most difficult borders are with and within former 
Yugoslavia and only a poor forecast indeed can foresee the stabilization of 
South Eastern Europe without some degree of inclusion of former Yugoslav 
countries. There is no final solution, nor indeed a temporary convenient one for 
former Yugoslav countries without their inclusion in the EU, regardless if this 
solution may seem remote and indeed far-fetched today. When crafting a border 
policy one has to keep in mind that Yugoslavia must be brought in Europe 
sooner or later if Europe wants peace on its South-Eastern front, and this can be 
achieved sooner than some people believe 7• The pessimism of some authors 
regarding former Yugoslavia is exaggerated8 Wasn't it equally difficult at a 
given time to conceive the German-Polish or the German-French reconciliation, 
not to speak of the Spanish-Spanish one? It is difficult indeed to be optimistic 
about Yugoslavia within the current limited framework of imagination, as the 
embattled, not viable and not-even-ethnic-homogenous statelets outside the EU.9 
Same applies to Albania: smuggling Albanians into Italy will continue forever, 
despite Italy being a full Schengen member, if Albania is not given more hope it 
can belong to Europe some day. 
ii. Some of the borders with problems are between accession countries 
and their neighbors, who would be excluded once all applicant countries adopt 
the Schengen acquis. Hungary's border with former Yugoslavia, where a strong 
Hungarian minority lives in Vojvodina still, Poland's border with Ukraine, 
where a large Polish minority lives, and Romania's border with Moldova fall in 
this category. To be sure, these are not conflict-leading borders per se; nobody 
would wage war to change them. But making those borders impermeable would 
severe minorities' connections with countries where the bulk of theirs culture 
lies, prompting illegal entrances and feeding resentment. Formal barriers stop 
ordinary citizens, students and truck drivers: they fail to stop criminals. 
iii. The same risk is faced in the third circumstance, the very plausible 
event that even within the current pool of applicants to the EU some .will join 
sooner and others later - considerably later (Romania and Bulgaria apply for 
7 If Europe would not have been pursuing policies crafted in the Cold War era, but have 
timely come out with an enlargement offer to Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the German 
unification, European history might have been spared its most recent war (see also Kramer 
1993). 
8 See Stokes 1997, for instance. 
9 Let us imagine for a moment that the EU would decide to bring in all former Yugoslavian 
states in the same time, therefore setting the most important incentive to peace possible. Even 
if this would upset the more developed states, such as Croatia, for instance, and would 
basically alter the current rule, the one-joins-when one is ready approach, good policies are 
built on good incentives embedded within. Borders, not economic development is the 
prevailing common problem of former Yugoslav states, and border-solving business requires 
regional, not country-by-country approaches. 
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certai~, but things may get messy even for Poland). Foreseeing such a 
development, the cyrrent Hungarian government has, for instance, crafted a bill, 
granting Hungarians- living--in neighboring- countries (Siovaki~, -Rol:iiiiilla, 
Ukraine, foimer Yugoslavia) liinitedci~~Q~hir rights, that is, entitlement to 
limited work-permits and benefits;- aiihoiiglJ. 11oi the right to cast a vote in 
Hungarian elections (the so-called S_tatus ]liil). As, with the exception of 
Slovak.ia, these countries are still on the black list of visas, Prime Minister 
Orban may have reasoned correctly on behalf of the 4 million Hungarians living 
in neighboring countries, of which quite a few Ily to work in Budapest, at least 
seasonally10. Such policy remains to prove itself as having the pOtential to solve 
more problems than start new ones. Most Hungarians from outside Hungary 
were eligible for work permits even before the 'Status bill' was passed by the 
Hungarian Parliament; if they did not apply for such a permit is because there is 
a black market of labor for seasonal workers, and only a black one. It is 
affordable to hire Magyars from surrounding countries because they settle for 
lower wages and no taxes have to be paid to the state by the employer, and the 
law will not change this economic rationale. The main driving rationale behind 
the law was nevertheless the need to do something to help ethnic Hungarians 
residing in neighboring countries not to fall behind the border once it will 
become the border of enlarged Europe. 
Once a border is set, albeit conventionally, it starts working_as_a border, in 
other words, it starts generating differences across it, and homogeneity within.11 
Even more so when a border is designed as the manifestation of a VasfProgram 
of crafting a new identity and the common reality underlying it, as is the case 
with unified Europe. This implies that current differences between Schengen-
joining accession countries and those falling behind so far, as well as differences 
between the former and their neighbors to the East will increase. Gaps will only 
widen by the imposition of impermeable borders.12 
2. Culture, and not development is what divides East from West? 
The difference between the development of Western and Eastern Europe is 
above any controversy. Even where we are dealing with the same history and the 
same culture, as is the case of Eastern Germany versus Western Germany 
decades of more investment are needed to mend the destruction Communism 
caused to the economy and society. However, this development border was 
10 The status bill has been long pending before being passed on June 19 by the Hungarian 
parliament. Its initial version had many discriminations which were subsequently dropped 
acting on EC' s suggestions. 
11 This worked in post-1918 Eastern Europe to a large extent, in unitary states more than in 
federal ones. Only the region was so heterogeneous on all counts it did not work fully. 
12 See Vahl, Batory Foundation Policy Paper 
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much less an object of public concern in the West as was the 'cultural' assumed 
one. More than one version of where this border actually stands has been around 
in the past decade. Vaclav Have! himself and Timothy Garton Ash have 
acknowledged between Western and Central Europe the existence of 'a wall in 
our heads'. Many Central Europeans, who strive to prove their cultures are a 
hundred percent Western, unlike the Eastern European one, who is 'different' 
indeed, implicitly accept tltis argument, but only strive to push tltis cultural 
border further to the South and the East13 • Samuel Huntington endorsed this with 
his William Wallace-based argument: 'The Velvet Curtain of Culture has 
replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in 
Europe' 14• 
This well-phrased assertion came under serious attacks: however, one 
must acknowledge that even imagined borders can, at times, if we are dealing 
with widespread perceptions, turn into real borders, so 'the wall in our heads' 
can well be of our own doing. Until the last day of the last Millennium, for 
mstance, Eastern Balkan countries, despite being invited to join the EU, were 
black-listed by the EC and most member states as well, so in order to travel to 
the rest of Europe their inhabitants needed to get a visa at the consulate of some 
member state, a process often expensive, time consuming and humiliating. 
Conntries falling witltin the cultural borders, despite being rated similarly in 
terms of their overall performance by the EU, as Slovakia, or not even featuring 
among invited countries, as Croatia, enjoyed a lot more freedom of movement 
witltin Europe than Bulgaria and Romania. However, when checking the public 
opinion data no cultural differences seem to matter. On the average East 
Europeans report having an 'European identity' more than West Europeans, 
amazingly, but this probably reflects only their strong desire to end the forced 
separation of Europe they have lived through fifty years of Communism. 15 
Comparisons of Eastern and Western Europe (Heywood, White and Miller, 
1998) or within Eastern Europe (Rose et al., 1998; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2000b), as 
well as cultural classifications based on World Values Survey (Inglehart, 1997) 
show that Eastern Europe falls within one cultural area, with the recent influence 
of Communist overriding dramatically any remote influence of past regimes or 
cultural factors such as religion16. In tenns of development, however, things are 
13 Timothy Garton Ash reviewed this argument a number of times. See also Todorova 
(1997)." 
14 I quote after the original article 'A Clash of Civilizations?' from the summer 1993 issue of 
Foreign Affairs. 
15 ISSP survey on national identity, 1995. 
16 The famous cultural Huntington divide between Catholic Habsburg Central Europe and 
O~od~x O~oman Balkans does not exist. Multivariate models explaining democratic 
onentat:lon fall to turn out religion as a predictor (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998); when 
comparing within a closer development range, that is, Romania and Bulgaria against fellow 
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quite different. And the imagined wall becomes a very real wall indeed when 
one considers the figures of foreign investment per capita, which by itself 
explains a lot why some transitions were successful and others not. Historical 
legacies of development, however, can hardly be seen as 'cultural' legacies and 
they should not be considered as such. 
Figure 2. EU applicant countries· Selected indicators 
cz ES HU PL SL BU LV u RO SK 
GDP/capita adjusted by purchase 62 38 53 42 73 24 29 31 28 49 
power parity (PPP- 1999) 
Foreign direct investment 1.68 1.64 2.05 1.04 1.35 0.464 1.75 0.649 0.268 0.389 
(FDf)/capita- thousands USD 
Trust in Parliament(Freedom House 15 - 25 25 20 12 13 21 
and NDB V combined) 
Can the most severely constrained of these soc1et1es, the countries beyond 
Huntington's fault line to the east carry the burden of EU accession with little 
direct foreign investment, and insignificant structural aid? The problem is more 
pressing for Romania and Bulgaria, which seem to fall behind the rest of the 
group, but only due to persistence or aggravation of stronger initial constraints, 
low foreign direct investment and interest in general. Without a proper 
differentiation of policies17 in order to make the Helsinki invitation more than 
just a symbolic thanks to Balkan countries for support over Kosovo18, chances 
are the Eastern border will be set between Central Europe and the Balkan 
countries, which would induce major political disadvantages and will prove the 
Balkan stability pact an empty catchphrase. This would point clearly to the fact 
that the border is economical more than political: both Bulgaria and Romania 
showed clearly they are committed Euro-Atlantic supporters throughout the 
Kosovo campaign and the 2000 elections in Romania, despite initial worries, 
produced a government with similar foreign policy to the previous one. Both 
countries have come to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria. But also both 
countries have a long legacy of stronger constraints: Ottoman rule, 
second-wave applicant but catholic and Central European Slovakia not only religion, but even 
nationality does not make a difference (Mungiu-Pippidi 2000a). 
17 Vaughan-Wbitehead 2000 also emphasizes the widening gap between applicant countries 
and considers differentiation essential. See also Mungiu-Pippidi 2000a. 
18 A quite ineffectual thanks to this effect. The unpopular policy of support for NATO 
bombing cost the Romanian liberal government a dramatic drop in popularity followed by 
losing office. The Bulgarian government, despite holding elections only a year later also paid 
dearly in popular sympathy. 
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underdeveloped institutions, more closed and repressive communist regimes, 
large ethnic minorities, vicinity with Yugoslavia and therefore reliance on the 
Danube trade, paralyzed by embargo and war for most of the past decade19• 
If no cultural problems can be found despite so many self-fulfilling 
prophesies, development problems abound. Few dare to phrase it plainly in such 
non-political correct terms, but the major problem of Europe of today and 
tomorrow is how to protect its hiiVen-S-Ofprosp-ericy from- an invasion of 'tartars', 
its high living standards from the need to redistribute wealth to poor regions of 
post-communist Europe and it§: sp-cial acquis from a more liberal American-type 
approach20• And it may well be that the latter requires the former. The 
aiD.b(guOus career of the Buio so far ·and the slOWdOwn of the American 
economy create further need for Europe to protect its moderate growth and 
pursue cautiously its economic integration. This leaves little room for a daring 
policy to increase competitiveness, to radically reform EU spending and to use 
the enlargement as an opportunity to boost the European economy. And as long 
as EU has a conservative policy towards its budget and enlargement remains, in 
terms of spending, a third rank policy, economic challenges to the Eastern 
border remain considerable. 
The first remains the issue of freedom of movement. According to various 
sources, even Slovenia, which has the highest per capita income of all applicant 
countries might need twelve to twenty years to level its living standards with 
neighboring Austria. As long as differences between Western and Eastern 
Europe remain so dramatically high the worry that the enlargement will be 
followed by a wave of innnigration persists. So far, the German and the Austrian 
governments have been the most active among member states in this area, as 
they considered themselves to come under the most serious threat. Germany has 
recently managed to obtain from the Commission a stall of 5 to 7 years on the 
freedom of movement of workers once the first applicants are in. For Poland and 
Hungary, this WaS a considerable blow, as governments there have constantly 
quoted the free movement of labor as the main incentive of the European 
accession. Hungary suggested in reply that such a decision is acceptable only if 
applied bilaterally. With the structural aid and the CAP reformed to allow 
newcomers a share, and the free movement of labor blocked, EU becomes quite 
unattractive to the most advanced applicants, who are also required to adopt and 
19 The Gothenburg European Council acknowledged this and included the idea that the 
applicants facing more problems need more help for the first time in a resolution on 
enlargement. 
20 See France's Prime MinisterLionel Jospin speech on EU, niT of May 29,2001 
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;· -;~1_ym:~ the full Schengen acquis even before becoming EU members?1 To 
: ·._ae>~9~aiU;' the accession process has also other important advantages: the most 
··:)J!lPoft~t one is that it gives clear direction to a process of institutional and 
''ecor<:>!hlc transformation, prompting even reluctant governments (such as - at 
0tfur~s- the Romanian or the Slovak ones) to do necessary reforms. But such 
incentives are quite meaningless for countries such as Estonia or Poland who 
move ahead at full speed already. Unsurprisingly, public support for the EU in 
these countries is declining as perceptions of sacrifices induced by years of 
·liberal reforms prevail over short-time hopes to boost living standards via EU 
accession. 
The concern with the potential immigration of cheap labor force from the 
East may be exaggerated, but remains a serious one, in bad need for a common 
policy. Some separation is needed, however, between fears of raising criminality 
in the enlarged Europe, addressed in detail by the Schengen acquis and the 
policy documents of Home and Justice Affairs, so needing only intelligent and 
effective implementation and the problem of immigration, which badly needs a 
totally different set of policies.22 
How justified is the fear of massive immigration? Most authors agree it is 
much exaggerated (Langewiesche and Lubyova 2000). Extrapolations from the 
past enlargement process or current figures have obvious limitations. Polls 
confirm, however, that Poland's or Romania's immigration potential remains 
quite high. Other estimations point to a figure of 35% of would-be employees 
out of a total of 335 000 residents who are assumed to immigrate following the 
removal of barriers after the frrst wave of enlargement.23 
21 When one is poor one also lives in the wrong neighborhood, it seems. Strict geographical-
economical determinism seems to guide the EC' s policy on Schengen, imposing on 
newcomers harder rules than on Western non-Schengen member-states and non-members. 
22 See also Batt and Amato, 2000 on this distinction. 
23 According to a Brussels-commissioned report by the German think tank DIW. 
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Figure 3.- Regulation of work permits m· EU . countries 
Total number of 
I pennits Access for self-employed? ~e long-terms residence permits 
Austria 126.889 (1999) Only residence permit ISSued? 
Belgium 83.500 (1999) With prior agreement of 
Yes, for I year 
Ministry Yes, after 5 years 
Denmark 73.092 (1999) Very rarely, only for important 
Finland' 
aspect of the activity Yes, if a work pennit is granted 
Oni_Y residence permit, and Yes, usually for 1 year busmess plan 
France 
- M~y professions prohibited to 
fore1gners Yes, between 1 and 10 years 
Germany 1.083.268 (2000) Yes, lengthy procedures Yes, granted up to 5 years 
Greece 69.600 (1997) Yes, required financial resources Yes, between 1 and 10 years, 
Ireland 2.600 (1997) renewable each year ~ Yes, but nbusiness permission" 
required Yes, for I year 
Italy 30.000 (1999) y, 
Yes, after 5 years 
Luxembourg 6.800 (1997) Yes, bunk guarantee must be 
paid Yes, for I year 
Netherlands 20.816 (1999) Yes, residence permit needed Yes, for 1 year. After 3 years no more 
work permit needed. After 5 years 
Portugal 
-
permanent residence pennit is ilranted 
y, under certain conditions " 
Spain 
Yes, if has resided legally for at least 
85.526 
10 years. 
y, Y~, after6 years a permanent 
Sweden 220.000 
res1dence permit may be applied for 
y, Ye~, after 2 years a permanent . 
U.K 72.599 Very tough conditions 
res1dence permit may be applied for 
After 4 years work permit holders can 
apply for permanent settlement 
F" 4 Jgure . Eastern European would be worke 
"tb - rs 10 eEU 
Would you be personally interested in finding Czech Hungary Poland 
a job in one of the EU COUntri Bulgaria Romania es once your Republic 
country enters EU? (%) 
IX V IX V IX V V V 
L Yes, I am interested and I 'IJ . 
00 OI 00 01 00 01 01 01 
w1 cenamly try 4 4 6 7 10 2
· Yes, I am interested and 1 will probably try 
13 9.6 17,3 
7 8 7 7 8 
Source; CEORG poll, 2001 
10 10,6 13.5 
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The figure is by no means scary, although Germany's fear of Polish immigration 
has already succeeded in halting the free movement of labor for five to seven 
years. The problem lies however with the next wave of countries, those with a 
higher migration potential, from Lithuania to Romania. The problem lies with 
the difficulty to solve the Roma problem in a foreseeable time framework and 
not to feed the already existing perception of Romanians and Bulgarians that the 
EU Member States operate with double standards, on the one hand asking these 
countries to solve their Roma problem, on the other hand delaying their entrance 
from fear of floods of Roma invading Western Europe (Heirnerl and Petkova 
200i; 182) Not to be mistaken, the walls of a fortress are neededto-keepoeggilis 
oUt,--but -how thick can you make them and would the cost not exceed in the end 
the one of paying to solve the cause? The model Europe should look at more 
closely is the Greek one: following the abandon by the Simitis government in 
1996 of the practice of forcefnlly expelling of Albanian illegal migrants an 
estimate of about 500 000 hundreds Albanians work in Greece, representing a 
boosting factor for both economies. 
It has already becOme obvious that the second issue related to the new 
economic border concerns the Roma. The large migrant communities of Roma 
have managed to cross the borders regardless of all the barriers in the past ten 
years and little is there to keep them in their home countries, where they are 
allegedly politically discriminated, and certainly economically disadvantaged. 
Enforcing the borders against the Roma was not a solution in the last decade and 
it will not work in the next one either: the Romanian Roma, for instance, have 
reached the point where they control the black market for some products in the 
underground Paris rnaxket24• Roma claim that they are the targets of racially 
motivated discrimination and violence in candidate countries; candidate state 
government officials make the counter-claim that they are merely economic 
migrants25 Both have found support for their claims within the EU: 
discrimination and violence against Roma is highlighted in the EU' s Regular 
Reports, but Romani claims for asylum in EU Member States are generally 
denied.26• While implementing anti-discrimination policies we should not for 
24 such as selling of homeless' newspapers 
25 Commenting on the case of Romany families from Zllmoly seeking asylum in France, 
Hungarian Prime 1vfinister Viktor OrbB.n told Hungarian Radio on 9 August 2000 that "Roma 
in Hungary should try to learn and work more." J6zsef Krasznai, spokesman of the Z~oly 
group, said Orb:in would be entitled to make such comments "only when all Romany children 
are able to cro to standard schools and Roma are not discriminated against on the labor 
market." R.F£oo. Newsline, 10 August 2000. 
26 One of the more dramatic examples of Member State attitudes towards Romani asylum-
seekers came when Belgium ignored a stay on deportation issued by the European Court of 
Human Rights and forcibly deported a large group of Roma asylum-seekers to Slovakia in 
October 1999. See RFE/R.L Newsline Vol. 5, No. 2, Part ll, 4 January 2001. See also Claude 
Cahn and Peter Vermeersch, Tthe Group Expulsion of Slovak Roma by the Belgian 
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one moment imagine those have the potential to solve the issue, however: 
affirmative programs for Roma, now in fashion, are not without utility, but 
neither do they address the hard issues. Nor are aggressive demands from the 
part of human rights groups to grant Roma coming from former Yugoslavia 
political asylum in Western countries likely to be successful. 
The largest group, the Romanian Roma is a 1.5 million-strOng ethnic 
group that cannot even be called a community due to its loose, fragmented, pre-
modern organization and the important differences within the group itself27• The 
Romanian Roma are the heirs of slaves liberated between 1848 and 1854 from 
large domains, who have enjoyed neither the kind of social assistance the 
American black community have, nor have ever lived in a prosperous country. 
The legitimacy enjoyed in their own ethnic group by leaders who get to discuss 
with governments and international organizations is low to nil. 
Figure 5. Numbers of Roma in selected EU countries 
COUNTRY HUNGARY SLOVAKIA 
NoRoma 140--600,000 80-520,000 
Can one realistically assume that Romania is able to tackle the heritage of its 
Roma by itself? Despite producing a national strategy for Roma at the request of 
Brussels, it is clear such a document can be a proof of good will only. A 
country, which has not succeeded an economic breakthrough since the fall of the 
Wall cannot solve a problem proved long and strenuous even in the most 
advanced economies. Even if to a smaller degree, the problem exists in other 
countries in the region as well. In this spirit, the Czech government has asked for 
the 'Europeanization' of the Roma problem. Some programs, mostly based on 
community building and empowerment of groups, in other words, more on a 
social capital type of approach may work, but these require not only 
considerably more funds, but also a different approach to assistance programs 
and the understanding of the Roma issues?8 And it would take decades to 
Government: A Case Study of the Treatment of Romani Refugees in Western Countries", 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Spring/Summer 2000. 
27 The Roma population is subdivided into almost 40 groups, according to customs and 
traditional structures, occupations, language, religion, and degree of nomadism. Roma 
groups include the Bear owners (Ursari), the tinsmiths and coppersmiths (Caldarari), the 
musicians (Lautari), the whitewashers (Spoitori), the blacksmiths (Fierari), the horse dealers 
(Grasdari), the woodworkers (Rudari), the flower sellers (Boldeni), the jewellers (Argintari), 
the goldwashers (Aurari). Another distinction to be made is between those settled, sedentary 
(Vatrasi) and the tent dwellers (Corturari). 
28 A successful example of such a program is the World Bank's Social Development Fund in 
Romania. Targeted at the poorest communities the program matches WB fund_s with 
community resources (most often Iabor). Field operators identify communities most in need, 
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properly solve the historical inequalities, even if the positive signal of starting 
such a mass scale program would certainly deter many Roma from emigrating. 
In other words, incentives have to be created to keep Roma in their countries, 
but countries as poor as Romania and Bulgaria cannot offer such incentives not 
; even to ethnic Romanians or Bulgarians for now. What countries can and 
should do is pay more attention and be more effective is enforcing equal 
treatment before the law - but that will have little practical consequence in 
preventing immigration, A global European strategy to the Roma issue is· badly 
needed. 
3. Good ends somehow generate their own effective means? 
The failure or success of an institutional transformation on the scale of the 
European integration of a post-communist country, seems increasingly to rest 
upon clear delimitation between the ends of a transformation - let us call these 
fmal institutions, e.g. Eastern economies competitive with Western ones, and the 
means used to attain those, such as the acquis. The mixing of the two in the 
policy discourse and debate have occurred more often than not in the past 
decade, and in the most difficult country cases (which had been subjected 
previously to deeper communization processes) such approaches inflicted major 
damages to the transformation management. Examples accounting for dramatic 
failures can vary from competition policies to law enforcement.29 It is not a 
simple issue of empowerment, although empowerment is important, but an 
imperative need to assert the necessity of intennediate institutions30, to identify 
them correctly (as the final institutions are obvious: the White Book and the 
Agenda 2000 state those in clear) and then implement them by empowering the 
right agents. From economic development to social inclusion and ability to 
integrate into Europe much will depend on the strengthening of institutions and 
governance in East Central Europe. Gradual integration with the European 
Unioq will require significantly more mature institutional structures, able to 
satisf)l the economic, political framework conditions of the EU and to 
implement the "acquis communautaire". Unlike other strategies that come at 
package with at least some intermediate institutions (like development 
strategies), European accession is an end often deprived of means, and quite a 
burdensome end for countries were institutions are weak, norms shabby and 
advertise the program and help local organization. It is hard to imagine such an effective 
program could be run by the EU one day, as the application procedures are minimal, the 
op~r~tor assists applicants in doing them and the applicants do not even need to be legal 
entitles, proof of a shared bank account being sufficient. 
29 See Stephen Holmes' report on the failure of assistance programs to reform Russia's 
Judiciary in East European Constitutional Review, Volume 8, Number 4, Falll999 
-"
0 The meaning granted to institutions here is of sets of rules and practices; institutions are the 
means of governance, not its ends, therefore instrumental and intermediate in their essence. 
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resources scarce. One cannot stress enough the need for institutional 
development necessary for East Central European countries to become reliable 
partners in the EU integration process31 • Good governance comes basically from 
a set of institutions which structure political and economic life, and reaching 
those require often intermediate institutions able to motivate people and 
organizations to change from whatever institutions they previously had (the 
Communist ones, in our case) to the new required ones. Such transformations 
can and should be measured. 
. Weak institutions cut across government agencies and tasks- it is highly 
unlikely that some sector will have strong institutions, and another weak ones. 
Obviously, many transition countries have weak institutions and the high degree 
of institutional transformation required by successive ideologies and 
contradictory targets throughout transition have weakened them even further. 
The core services the government is supposed to provide, such as the legal and 
judicial protection to citizens are the most affected by institutional weaknesses, 
although most of the public debate is focusing on the market institutions. On the 
overall, the weakness of institutions in the area we are interested in -justice and 
home affairs- can use the concept of accountability as an useful proxy. ECE 
countries need to build accountable governments and public agencies. The 
dramatic discontent with the political class and political organizations of the 
publics lies in the overspread feeling the government is unaccountable. More 
often than not this perception is rooted in reality, due to the fact that institutions 
of horizontal accountability are extremely weak or plainly missing. In developed 
democracies vertical accountability is provided by the constituencies, and by 
competition for resources between levels of government. The legislature and the 
judiciary provide formal horizontal accountability, but also NGOs, interest 
groups, and a fair and strong media have an essential contribution to informal 
horizontal accountability. 
Surveys of the applicant countries show important differences among them, but 
also point to a clear underdevelopment of institutions of accountability and law 
enforcement in general. 
_In the. following lines I shall quote series of data coming from various sources, 
mcluding a 2000 accountability survey of East Central Europe (Mungiu-Pippidi 
2000) by the Romanian Academic Society. These include the World 
Development Report Survey of Enterprises 1997, the EBRD!World Bank 1999 
Business Enterprise Performance Survey, Transparency International, KKZ, 
International Country Risk Guide, Heritage Foundation, IMF Global fmancial 
Statistics, and the International Telecommunications Union. According to the 
"s ee the 2000 World Bank strategy report for South-Eastern Europe for a broader argument 
on this. 
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EBRD/World Bank 1999 Business Enterprise Performance Survey, in the 
institutional infrastructure component, which measures perceptions of the 
Judiciary, Corruption, Street Crime and organized Crime, for instance, on a 
scale of 0 (major obstacle) to 3 (no obstacle), Bulgaria is rated 1.49 and 
Romania 1.48. This compares to Hungary (2.34), Slovenia (2.23), Czech 
Republic (1.97) and Poland (1.7). Both subjective and objectives estimate of 
corruption and accountability show a similar picture: most countries fall in the 
lower half of the scale. Romania and Bulgaria, Eastern Balkan countries score 
b~low Croatia on rule of law items. Poland is not doing very much better 
compared to Eastern Balkan countries, though. We included countries of former 
Yugoslavia to facilitate comparisons between the three-speeds of Eastern 
Europe. Three clusters are indeed emerging, with Slovenia and Hungary on top, 
with high compatibility on Home and Justice items, FRY and FY on the bottom, 
with Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia somewhere in the middle on the scale, and 
Poland and the Czech Republic above them. This shows the three countries 
supposed to become the next 'buffer' area of the EU to the East, Poland, 
Romania and Bulgaria are not the best prepared for such a task. 
Figure 6 Rule of law in Eastern Europe. Selected Indicators 
Selected LegaVJudiciallndicators 
Albania Slovakia Bulgaria Croatia FYROM Romania Kosovo Hungary 
FH Rule of law 5.25 3.75 4.75 4.50 4.25 5.00 1.75 
WDR Predictable 4.66 4.61 NA 4.28 NA NA 3.65 
judiciary 
EBRD Law and order NA 1.38 1.43 NA 1.07 NA 2.34 
index 
KKZ rule oflaw index -0.92 -0.15 0.15 -0.26 -0.09 NA 0.71 
ICRG law and order 2 4 5 NA 4 NA 6 
(0-6) 
SAR- accountability 1.51 2.64 1.74 
FH" index (0-5) 
FH Corruption /3 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 1 
Note: Bigger numbers indicate worse governance for FH and WDR97. Bigger numbers indicate better 
governance for EBRD law and order index, TI, KKZ, SAR and ICRG. 
32 Average of response rate (0-lowest 5-higest) of government agencies when asked to 
produce the most recent activity report. 
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The "Area of freedom, security and justice" has shown an extraordinary build-
up of structures and activities as a reaction to perceived transnational threats to 
internal security; the outcome was the proposal of common structures and 
measures at the European level. There have been quite a number of those over 
the last ten years. Mon"!: (1999) quotes: 
""'--·-
(A) a proliferation of centralized European mechanisms of control such as 
the upgrading of Schengen external border controls, the creation of the 
Schengen Information System (SIS), the establishment of Europol, the 
build-up of the Customs Information System. and the agreement on the 
Eurodac Convention; 
(B) the adoption of a large number ofbindiug and non-binding restrictive 
texts in the areas of asylum and immigration, which include the Dublin 
Convention, various resolutions to restrict immigration, the re-admission 
agreements concluded by the Schengen members with third countries, 
etc.; and 
(C) some frrst measures aimed directly at improving law enforcement, 
such as the imposition of uniform minimum sentences for fraud against 
the EC budget, the criminal law measures taken against cross-border 
corruption, the facilitation of extradition, and the first steps in pennitting 
cross-border law enforcement operations. 
At the 1999 Tarupere Council substantial steps have been taken towards: the 
creation of a common asylum system (especially as regards procedures and 
minimum guarantees); the use of external EU instruments for the reducing 
immigration pressure on the Union; improving procedures in cross-border 
litigation; and enhancing the mutual recognition of judgments and more 
legislative action in the fight against money laundering. Two new institutions 
were created: EUROWST, which will have the task of facilitating the 
coordination of national prosecuting authorities and to support criminal 
investigations in organized crime cases; and a European Police College for the 
training of senior law enforcement officials. 
These highly complex and sophisticated instruments are supposed to be 
adopted almost in the same tine and many of them either prior to accession or 
~o~ d_aY one of accession by applicant countries. In the current stage of 
mst1tutwnal development of the Eastern applicants such adoption can be in 
many instances only formal. More time and assistance is needed in order to 
adjust both national legislation and practice to such a demanding task, and in 
some cases those won't even suffice. For borders policies to be effective, 
however, more than formal adoption is needed. As Home ministers from Poland 
and Romania have repeatedly pointed out, it is difficult to enforce borders 
without cooperation from neighboring countries. There is considerable 
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cmruption of custom and borders officers even in applicant countries where they 
receive their wages regularly (although they are asked to resist corruption with 
wages varying on the average between 100 and 400 USD), but on the Eastern 
neighbors side, in Ukraine and Moldova we often find law enforcement officers 
who are not paid at all. In Moldova there is a price tag for every felony, 
including life sentence.33 Infrastructure upgrade and professional training on a 
massive scale are needed, but the most serious issue of all is the socio-economic 
gap. How much above the national average can one pay law enforcement 
officers and judges to make sure they resist corruption? The disadvantage of 
giobalization is that bribes attain the level of developed countries even in 
underdeveloped ones, while even the highest wages in Eastern Europe's public 
sector cannot match the Western ones. Even by 2005 Slovakia, for example, is 
not likely to have reached more than 15-25% of the Austrian wage level (at 
current exchange rates). With the Czech Republic and Hungary wage disparities 
are not very different. 
Eastern countries have made considerable efforts to comply to 
requirements to bring their judiciary and law enforcement agencies in line and 
some progress is indeed visible. But there is a direct correlation between the 
general level of institutional development and the implementation of home and 
justice affairs. The countries in the future buffer zone have uneven potential, but 
even the most advanced ones are hardly able to carry the burden of the EU 
Eastern border by themselves. The approach so far has been to ask them to adopt 
the acquis- therefore to stress the final institution, the institutional end- and 
some support in training and infrastructure building via PHARE programs, 
reputed for their lack of flexibility and inability to contribute to institutional 
building. 
\Vhen describing the difficulties of Western assistance programs to reform 
of the law enforcement agencies in Russia Stephen Holmes (2000) makes a 
number of considerations with much larger applicability: 
The first steps of legal reform, such as deregulation, may be relatively 
easy. But subseqUent steps, such as creatini-ah honest CiVil service, are much 
harder. Improving the quality of public institntions requires a broader and deeper 
social consensus and capacity for cooperation than, say, currency stabilization or 
price liberalization. Law is a public good, and politically disorganized societies, 
by definition, have a hard time creating public goods. The magnitnde of the 
33 The latest form of the fight against corruption of law enforcement agencies has been the 
coming out, in Romania, of anonymous web sites disclosing corrupt policemen, again with 
price tags attached to various felonies. 
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challenge facing legal reformers can be expressed simply by recognizing that 
legal reform is a branch of state building. 
Evidence from East European states acknowledges this reality. The poor 
state of the judiciary is considered by analysts to be the most alarming problem 
within the Bulgarian and Romanian political systems. The budget for the 
judiciary in Bulgaria, for instance, is about a fiftieth of the average budget of 
comparable EU countries and the situation of other East European countries is 
not niuch better. What is even more worrisome is that the judiciary cannot be 
considered independent. For instance, the involvement of the executives 
(ptimarily the Ministries of Justice) in nominating of the judiciary, removal of 
attorneys in corruption cases and determining the budgets is a common feature 
(Azmanova 2000). 
Paradoxically, the channeling of Western fmancial assistance for liberal 
reforms through East European governments had only reinforced problems in 
many sectors: in many instances the PHARE programs finance directly the 
domestic administrative corruption and lack of effectiveness, mainly due to 
pressure from Bruxelles to spend the funds, rather than reach some clear targets 
that can be assessed. 'Success' of assistance programs to some East European 
governments means more often than not that that grantees managed to spend the 
allocated funds. A thorough diagnosis of what specific problem should have 
been targeted, by what means, by empowerment of what actors and to what 
fmality is often missing. Therefore, there is no surprise that vast sums of money 
out of the Western taxpayers' pockets are spent in the East with minimal effects. 
Promoting large scale institntional and societal change requires understanding of 
local situations based on thorough research, flexible and creative procedures to 
grant aid, and regular measurements s of aid's effects (so more than consultants' 
assessments). 
The advent of a new legal culture in Eastern Europe cannot be prompted 
unless a more comprehensive strategy is forged with the aim of building 
institutional social capital. This requires bringing in line various organizations 
able to act as agents of horizontal accountability, be it formal or informal and 
empowering them to act as partners, Ombudsmen and audit agents of 
governmental agencies in the framework of large coalitions for transparency and 
accountability of governments and public sector in general. Cormption and 
accountability issues have occupied little space on the agenda of the European 
accession negotiations so far. The reason for this is that they are informal 
phenomena, while negotiations are extremely formal in their nature. Therefore, 
informal realities, regardless of their importance, become the main casualties in 
the negotiation process. As the reform of the public administration in Eastern 
Europe is Brussels-driven, the EC needs to further strengthen its position on 
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accoun~ability ~d best administrative practices, and use its leverage to support 
dome~ti~ 'mam pulita' coalitions, not governments alone. If EC wants the 
negotzatzons to succeed in countries where informal institutions are at least as 
strong a~ formal ones there is little alternative to developing a strategy to 
address znf~'J"alproblems backed by a part of the resources dedicated to 
formal ones . It 1s only the mvestment in the former than can prompt some 
returns fro~ the investment in the latter. The same applies to countries which 
are not apph~ants - such as Russia - but are nevertheless massive recipients of 
European assistance programs for the reform of law enforcement agencies. 
5. Do good fences make good neighbours? 
Un~ke previous enlargements, this is the frrst to include the justice and home-
af~rurs. acquis, ~hich _now cover asylum, control over external borders, 
~~r~tlon, organ~zed cnme~ terrorism, drugs, as well as police, customs, and 
JUdicial cooperatiOn. Most rmportantly, the acquis also includes the Schengen 
agreement on the dismantling of border checks between member states. Article 8 
of the Protocol of the Treaty of Amsterdam which incorporates the Schengen 
acquzs specifie~ that future new members of the EU will have to accept the 
Home and Justice Affairs acquis in full. Most of the applicant countries have 
already started to adjust, as changes to the border control mechanisms, the visa 
reg1m~s and the conc~uswn of re-~dmission agreements with neighboring 
countries show. Romania and Bulgana were required to do this in order to be 1\ ', 
removed from the black list of visas, despite the perspective of membership \; 
bemg qUite d1stant for the_moment. In spite of the diversity of national practice " 
expressed through fleXlbihty arrangements within the Justice and Home Affairs 
regime (to accommodate Western countries that opt out, members such as UK 
and non-me~bers such as Norway), this regime is well on the way to becoming 
th~ sole regm:e for Europe, at least as regards its control and enforcement 
rationale and Its tendency to create central European controlling instruments 
such as Europe! and the SIS (Monar 1999). In other words, there is no room fo; 
negotlatwn here, Eas~ _European countries becoming passive consumers of 
asylum and border pohc1es of the EU. Applicant countries had done more or less 
to comply so far, the bottom line being more than less in all circumstances. 
Challenges vary greatly, though. 
Poland 
The security of Poland's eastern borders has become of serious concern to the 
EU. Not only has EU money (more than $50 million in 2000 alone) and 
techmcal assistance been provided to shore up Poland's ability to control its 
34c . . .c 
orruptton, an tnlonnal issue, cannot be addressed by fonnal training, for instance. 
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borders. In addition, the EU hopes to station German patrols along the Union's 
new Eastern front. According to Brandenburg's minister for justice and 
European affairs, up to 10,000 German border guards are available for a possible 
"Schengen border control" in Poland. Poland is also worried for the fate of 
ethnic Polish living in Ukraine. Indeed the various measures adopted between 
1997 and 1999 led to a dramatic decrease in border traffic (50%)35• Although 
Poland has initially resisted the ourright militarization of its borders with 
Ukraine and Belarus, Polish customs officers have begun to police the border in 
keeping with EU expectations. Gerruan-trained, Polish border brigades have 
successfully tightened restrictions, often using force and intimidation in the 
process; but in doing so they have also curtailed the vibrant "bazaar economy" 
that had sprung up in the border regions?6 As a result, economists estimate that 
140,000 jobs will be lost on the Polish side in a region that can ill afford such a 
reduction. It is also estimated that petty border trade accounts for as much as 29 
percent of Poland's exports (in 1996-97, for example). (Cirtautas 2000). There 
is also a political cost to these restrictions, combined with the long process of 
admission. Poland was once the East European country most in favor of 
membership. But now only 30 percent of those polled definitely support 
membership and only 59 percent would vote in favor of it, down from 80 
percent approval in 1996.37 
Increasing public awareness of stiff membership requirements has clearly 
shaken the public's confidence in the positive benefits of EU accession. If this 
trend continues, fostered by the inability of the Commission to resist proposals 
by member-states to block any form of redistribution towards the new entrants 
(reform of the CAP, structural funds) Poles might reject entering the EU in the 
referendum required to approve membership. 
Czech Republic 
The Czech Visa Policy was adjusted to come fully in line with that of the EU by 
the date of Czech Republic's accession to the EU. By its Resolution No. 843 of 
25 August 1999, the Czech Government approved the document "Concept of the 
visa policy", which contains a time schedule of concrete steps of harmonization 
of Czech policy with Council Regulation No. 574/99fEC determining the third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visa when crossing the 
external borders of the Member States. 
Since 1998 the visa modernisation project has been being implemented in 
the Czech Republic, including electronic exchange of data among of embassies, 
35 see Vahl. 
36 Newsweek International, September 18, 2000, p. 18 
37 CBOS Survey, July 2000 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs and M" . . 
E "' mistry of Intenor . th . xtenwng of the project is current! . . . m e VIsa process. 
y m course and It will be completed in 2000. 
A .unified visa format will be introduced i . 
date of Its accession to the Eu . . n the Czech Republic as of the 
57411999. The only problem ofrotpheanCUmhon In accordance with Regulation 
d . e zec s are therr· R h repeate warmng of the EC. oma, w o prompted 
Slovenia 
Slovenia has taken the most -tn_ . t~erefore the_f-tQs_estin spirit t~~th~~§~v:~p~roach ~o freedom of ~ov:ment and 
VIsas for Romania and Bulgaria in 2000 g n requrreme~ts .. Slovema Introduced 
for countries from CIS fonne y I '. followmg earlier mtroduction of visas 
sarue time it started th~ very r ugos aVIa (except Croatia), and Albania In the 
between itself and Croatia, d::;:~:e pr?cess of ~uilding a Schengen border 
non-applicant country (Croati ;;ulte excepuon~ status of Croatia as a 
Slovenia, Italy and Austria thanerse"are thee to travel Wlth ID pennits only in 
C a! ' wre ey are enJ· 0 ,.; irnil" • • • entr European advanced a r f . J ... ng s ar pnvileges to 
second-wave applicants) Des -~p !cants, ar m front of Christian Orthodox 
Croatia, gnmting a special Stapltue somec border problems between Slovenia and 
s to roatia has th 
member states and therefore is certai t d e support of a number of 
for Slovenia's full adopn"on f th nS oh en ure. No problems are there in line 
hi · 0 e cengenac ·SI · ghest livings standards of all th Ea qllls. ovema has also the 
· · . e stern European · IIDlDlgration potential. countries, so the least 
Hungary 
Of all the Countries in the first wave Hun 
borders open to neighboring c tn" Thigary struggled the most to keep its 
. oun es s IS due ·ru Important Hungarian communities livin . mru y to. the presence of 
Transylvania (Romania), Ruthenia (Ukr g m these countnes, notably in 
Slovakia. The Hungan· rune), Vojvodma (Yugoslavia) and 
an government put £ d . . 
heatedly debated 'stall!$ bilj', the aim of orwar m the spnng of 2001 a 
Hunganans' emii!Tation t'·B: ' which IS, allegedly, to stop ethnic 
their homelandso The b~ll unilglary and to ensure better conditions for them in 
H . . . · 
1 w grant a 'Hungari d' 
. ~nganan hvmg abroad who would a ~ car for each ethnic 
CI!lzenship: holders would b bl pply. The card lS a token of second-rank 
thr e a e to travel v1sa fre d k · ee months per year with all b fi . · e an wor m Hungary for 
right to vote, however, followin e~~~ts m~luded. They will not be gnmted the 
large numbers of Hungari . g g an. ardent mtemal debates. Due to the 
full citizenship rights woul":~a~e ~e~~~n~n~ Hcountries (4 million) granting of 
I Ize unganan domestic political life. 
24 
According to Foreign Ministry Secretary of State Szolt Nemeth38, some 25 
percent of ethnic Hungarians abroad wish to settle in Hungary, and the rate 
might increase when Hungary becomes a EU member. By adopting the status 
bill Hungary would honor a "historical obligation" .. It is not clear to what extent 
this decision of the Hungarian government is infull agreement to EU rules and 
can be sustained after Hungary becomes a member, since it discriminated__ in _ 
favor of ethnic Hungarian workers, but Hungary claims the·billfiees.ih~ir·b.and 
to fully impleinentScherigen: Needless to say, the bill was quite unpopular with 
Hungary's neighbors, mainly Romania, where a 1.6 million strong Hungarian 
community still lives. 
Slovakia 
Slovakia moved even ahead of Hungary. Since 1997, during Meciar 
government, it adopted the 'Slovak card' meant to expand some citizenship 
rights to ethnic Slovaks living in neighboring countries, notably Ukraine. 
Following this gesture Slovakia introduced visas for CIS countries and is 
complying to the request to have the full Schengen acquis adopted from the first 
day of accession. The border with Ukraine is Slovakia' s only 'hard' border, the 
rest are borders with EU or applicant countries. 
Romania 
Following the removal of Bulgaria from the black list of visas in 2000 Romania 
receives the least favorable treatment among applicant countries, although the 
Commission recommended in June 2001 that Romanian should be removed 
from the list as well snrrting with January 1" 2002. Travel to any EU country, 
plus Slovenia and Malta among applicant countries requires a visa for Romanian 
citizens. Only in the cases of Slovenia and Malta can the visa be granted at 
border entrance: for the rest application in person is needed at the Bucharest 
consulates. The Consulates of EU member-states in Romania are a picture of 
what would become the Polish or Romanian consulates in the CIS once these 
countries are admitted into Schengen. Despite manageable number of applicants, 
the Consulates are understaffed, perceive high taxes and prove unable to set 
appoinnnents to applicants, long and disgraceful queues being periodically 
showed on television. Corruption is rampant, and embassies are purged 
periodically of clerks accepting bribes in exchange for visas, only to start all 
over again as soon as others fill their places. The treannent is applied equally to 
Romanian graduate students of Western universities, renowned artists, 
journalists and businessmen, leading to frustration feelings and constant 
outbursts of anti-Western attitudes in the media. 
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Romania has three difficult b d . 
breaks of the embargo were report o~ :' w;,th Yugoslavia, where frequent 
Ukraine and Moldova. The last two ~ oug_ out the Yugoslav wars, with 
to the large number of Romanian-s : esent se_n?us ?roblems, not so much due 
frequent use of these borders by .f.si:e:s re~Iding m these :ountries, as to the 
Eastern Europe. Romania has si ed mmngrant~ a~ transit borders towards 
the repatriatJ· f ·u·-----=---!g!L _o_yer. 30..readmisswn .agreements. (all . 
. . . on o 1 egal IIUgrants from W . · owmg 
ongm), JOined almost one hundr d estern Europe to therr last countJy of 
fighting organized crime, pasgd ~ ~~;;~~ts With .regard to preve?ting and refug':~-~ .!i!!~Loverall it struggled to~-;-t-;~------~·-9{ ali,e~§--~~--@Jl_J?!'911la,Il_Ge __ on 
severell'~il:"i:ted in~££11ti_onal capacity. Entran~':ements m the frameworlc ofits 
the two largely Roman~- .. . . . ··- on the basis of ID only betw. een 1an states, Romania d M 1 recently and Moldovans have access on th b . an f o dova, was suspended 
although a visa is not required yet R e ~IS o passport only from now on 
passports. In the event of Romania. b oma~ua has also moved to secure it; 
foreseeable future simil· · ar . ~ econung a Schengen country in some 
massive euorts on th al th Poland, including import of bord d e se e at were deployed in W er guar s along with . fr 
estern Europe will certainly be ne d d I' th m astructure from 
moment Romania struggles t . e e or . ~ Eastern border to resist. For the 
Ukraine, which are both reluc~a::~~ re~dmisswn treaties with Moldova and 
former refused to show up to even di. e athtter. engaged m negotiations, but the 
SCUSS e ISSUe. 
Bulgaria 
Bulgaria has moved ahead to ti hten . b 
which introduced a far more sect! Its orders. In 1999 a law was adopted 
officers at the borders and . ~passport. Conscripts were replaced by police 
EU • VISas 10r some of the c tri bl 
were introduced. Due to these timel oun ~s ack -listed by the 
to be removed from the black list at th y n;a;~es, Bulgana had the satisfaction 
necessary and by no means sufficiente ;n d ofi 000. The EU decision came as a 
senous erosion of popular support aft ~ or the pro-EU government facing 
war and promoting austere fiscal po~~-en oThrsmg ~U and NATO in the Kosovo 
had a1r d b les. e sunilar Romanian 
ea y ecome a casualty in November 2000. government 
Baltic states 
The one significant problem of the Baltic t . . 
the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad B t . . s ates IS. overwhelmingly considered 
minorities of the Baltic states Wl.ll . du bit IS not qlllte so. The Russian speaking 
& • un ou tedly requ · . l~r relatives from Russia. B all . . rre so.me travel special status 
directly its isolation once cut ~om t~e:s, _Russia Itself IS certain to feel more 
pride for the Soviet Union and e altics, whose seaside resorts were once a 
Whil . a COIIUDOn destinati I' d . . e the nugration potential of the Balti . on or omestic tounsts. 
cs IS not so high, with the exception of 
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Lithuania, enforcing Schengen borders at the Baltics frontiers carries high 
political risks and costs. A flexible arrangement allowing Russian citizens at 
least to get national Baltic visas at the border so be able to travel freely in the 
Baltics', although prevented to enter the rest of the Schengen space without a 
visa looks as an absolute necessity. 
The implementation of the Schengen acquis by the new applicant states 
and the ·enforcement of the Schengen border looks as it answers so far only the 
security concerns of Western European states. Sch~ngen is hardly a '_s~curity 
and stability factor' _of E~te.m .Europ~--rather it induCes new tensions betwee~_­
neigtihouiilliCOUiitrleS; which had barely managed to surpass them with 
collS14~IabiidlffiCUlty. The situation is even more delicate concerning South 
EaS-te~-EUi:ope~<Wh~re the EU endorsed stability pact vowed to bring more 
stability and security to the region. Favouring Croats over Serbs even after the 
normalization of the situation in Serbia, the isolation of high-migration potential 
Bosnia and the new wall between Slovenia and the rest of Balkan countries can 
hardly be considered as stabilizing policies. Transitory or lasting forms of 
accommodation with neighbors are highly necessary. Those would cover the 
Ukrainian-Polish problem, the Romanian-Moldovan one, the Balkan borders in 
general. \Vhile rushing to join the EU, applicant countries should not forget that 
vicinities are lasting realities, and by no means is vicinity with Western Europe 
the only one to matter. Yugoslavia, Ukraine and Russia may not do well for the 
moment, but citizens of these countries bear no guilt for their political or socio-
economic inferior status and if they are far from gaining entrance in the club of 
the rich at least they should not lose their essential freedom to circulate in the 
former common East European space. This would only feed unnecessary 
frustration and resentment, which are anyway far from being in short supply in 
the region. 
6. Can elite consensus substitute general lack of support? 
Critics of the enlargement process in Eastern Europe see it is as an unnecessarily 
complicated, lengthy and half-heartily EU-endorsed process. Compared to the 
previous enlargement or its share in the expenditures' EU budget the 
enlargement looks indeed as a second-rank, low importance process. Supporters 
in Western Europe, who know the difficulty of pushing ahead the enlargement 
idea, which is popular in the West only as long as it does not cost taxpayers a 
penny, claim this slow speed is the only one possible: at a faster pace either East 
Europeans could not carry the burden of adjusllnent, or West European publics 
would get scared off and put a hold to the whole process. Despite low 
investment in funds, the process is no less a major historical one and in time it 
will show a lot was accomplished even with limited resources. By and large one 
gets the clear feeling, however, Easterners somehow steal the enlargement 
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through the back door of the EU with the help of the Commission and the 
political and mtellectual elites of a few member states. According to a recent E~robar~meter poll, a mere 27 percent of Westerners think enlargement is of 
pnmary lillportance for the EU, with Germans the wariest of EU citizens. That 
makes the Brussels bureaucracy the only consistent supporter of enlargement 
and adds to the democratic deficit between EU headquarters and member 
governments. No doubts speaking for his constituents back home, EU ~onurusswner for Enlargement, Guenther Verheugen, emphasized quite a few 
times that enlargement should represent an informed political choice by EU 
Citizen~. ~ut. that will not happen until the enlargement project ceases to be a low-~nonty Issue on the agenda of Western political leaders, who never had a 
consxstent and sustained program of ·selling' enlargement to domestic publics. 
Despite some temporary setbacks, the view that by and large Eastern 
Europe after 1989 has been a tremendous success (Vachudova 2000) seems to 
prevail over the pessimistic one that the region has changed at a slower pace 
than expected . Never before in history has democracy taken root somewhere at 
such an amazing speed: even countries which did not meet economic success 
such as Romania, had managed to solve centuries-long inter-ethnic proble~ 
more successfully than anyone had dared to predict eleven years ago. Successful 
markets have paved the way of societal transformation almost everywhere; the ?r~erent pac~s of transformations being explained more by the difference in 
mlt!al constraints than in anything else (Bunce 1999). 
Despite this, the situation of EU enlargement's popularity in Eastern Europ~ rs howev~r quite paradoxical. Large masses seem to endorse the EU 
acces~10n _process m polls, but evidence shows they are largely ignorant about it 
and grve It more of a s!mboiic endorsement than of anything else. Elites are, 
however, fully conm:utted, and this commitment has crossed over the 
co:nmunist/anti-c~~unist cleavage within the political class, which had 
existed_ at ~e. begmnmg of the transition. This had been an important gain for 
the regwn m Itself: the fact the pro-EU political discourse is the only legitimate 
discourse, all alternative discourses being so far de-legitimized. 
'---""'"""------'-_-
But .will. it last the difficulties of negotiations and integration? Pro-
Western ehtes m Eastern Europe are something the West has always taken for 
granted, and for good reason, too, because there has always seem to be a fair 
supply of those. Western political elites have swiftly moved ahead for 
enlargement because, among others, in compensation for deserting specifically 
those Eastern elites in 1938, 1945 and 1956 - to speak only of the most 
~xceptwnal ~oments. Less important on the greater historical scale, but 
Important still, we have seen the fall of the first democratically elected 
Rornaruan leader in a century, Emil Constantinescu, who became unpopular 
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mainly due to his support of NATO in the highly unpopular war waged by the 
West on a neighbor, traditional ally and fellow Orthodox country. Leader of the 
most constrained East European country, carrying the heritage of Ceausescu' s 
worst totalitarian European regime, Constantinescu had never enjoyed decisive 
Western support.39 
, Lack of support for pro-European leaders by the West and lack of mass 
awareness campaigns on the historical importance of the enlargement in the EU 
can only shipwreck the whole process sooner or later. When this will happen 
Europe may find itself prey to a return of populism already anticipated by some 
elections' results in late nineties and early 2000's, from Jorg Raider to Vadim 
Tudor. Everything in our power must be done to prevent such a development. 
Conclusions 
All problems have solutions, more if looked at in detail, fewer if addressed 
globally. The European Eastern border is no exception to that rule. At a broad 
and historical scale it may look as a hopeless game, especially for Europe's 
Balkan, former Ottoman-dominated territories, but generally speaking for the 
Christian Orthodox and Muslim Eastern Europe. Voltaire was famously stating 
that Europe should distance itself from the Balkan peninsula, then under Turkish 
occupation: its former Byzantine affiliation mattered less for him than the need 
to keep Europe away from legendary Thrace.'0 Of course, the fact that precisely 
the Orthodox countries are falling behind Europe, within and without the future 
enlarged EU border may mean nothing in itself. The case of Greece shows that 
geographical determinism, not religion, is at the origin of Europe's post-modern 
border. Passive endorsement by Western leaders of cumulated negative 
geographical determinisms, however, by giving less attention and investment 
instead of more to South Eastern Europe can only lead to a reinforcement of the 
vicious circle and the setting of the European border north of the Balkan 
Peninsula. Voltaire's waruing would be then fulfilled. 
Looking in more detail to problems, there are a few obvious policy 
options to endorse if such negative developments are to be prevented. These are 
based on a number of assumptions, however, some not quite optimistic. 
Assumption number one considers that Europe will not start a process of 
major change of its enlargement strategy, spending reform and the rest until the 
first group of accession countries, including Poland, will join; even then it will 
39 This is not to blame Constantinescu's (and his regime's) downfall entirely on the West. The 
West carries nevertheless a serious responsibility for the handling of the 1999 due Romanian 
foreign debt. 
40 Essai sur les moeurs, CXCVII. 
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be a great ~obi~~a~on from some Member States to reduce the impact of these 
new countrtes JOimng Europe, and especially the need to creatively reform 
Europe. Invention of several exceptions and transitional thresholds of all kinds41 
to. ~revent the new members from enjoying basically the same rights and 
pnvde~es as the old ones and to protect the old rules of the game42 may be in 
store st1ll. 
Assumption num.ber two is that the enlargement process will be delayed or 
·even halted after the frrst group of countries joining, more if Poland is part of 
th1~ first group, ~ess 1f It IS not, due to difficulties presented at point one and the 
seno.us econonnc gap between some of the applicant countries and the EU, 
des~Ite pro~ess recorded with the formal adoption of the acquis. Since EU' s 
foretgn pohcy towards Eastern Europe in the past decade was largely an 
Incremental, self-mterest filtered response to strong pressures from Vishegrad 
countries mainly (Smith 1999) we can assume that once these pressures will 
ease the process will be stalled, although important points on the agenda of the 
new entrants (such as Poland's need to keep a flexible Eastern border) will 
likely make it on top of the agenda. 
. Assumption number three supposes that change control in order to keep it 
at an mcrementa! pace will nevertheless fail in the end and the reality will force 
some Important adjustments as soon as a joint pressure will be put on by the 
wave of deceived first-wave joiners on one hand and the delayed (from different 
reasons) second w~ve applicants on the other. This may not go as far as the 
expected opp.ortumty to 'remodel Europe's economic and social shape' 43 
(Vaughan Wlutehead 2000) but it will prompt some adjustments nonetheless. 
. Assumption number four is that, due to the lack of a coherent and clear 
pohcy target, as well as their large size continuing to act as an amplifier of 
problems and therr development legacies, the great CIS countries, notably 
Russia .and ~krrune may enjoy growth but will remain tremendously poor, 
altematmg epxso~e~ .of democracy with episodes of political violence. illegal 
border-related activities, as well as immigration pressures on the EU border will 
onl_y ~ow as this border moves further East. Furthermore, a new wave of 
sohdanty among Orthodox countries with painful transitions will bring them 
closer to Russxa, who Will start to act more and more as a representative of the 
whole area East of the enlarged Europe. 
41 O~e example is the April 2001 Commission decision to phase for five to seven years the 
jfantmg of.full mobility ?~ts to new entrants at Gennany' s request. 
. see, for mstance, Spam s reluctance to conceive a change in the distribution of structural 
atd, 'What's ours is ours', The Economist of May 26, 2001. 43 RSC no 29/2000 
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Assumption number five is that Croatia and Serbia will however record a 
positive evolution, problems in Kosovo and Macedonia will become milder but 
chronic, and Bosnia will remain a hard to sustain state. 
Given these assumptions three broad recommendations seem more 
appropriate: 
A case-by case differential approach 
The one-size-fits all enlargement policy worked well with countries that were 
small enough, committed enough and received a high level of foreign direct 
investment. Its weakness is more and more visible in all the other cases, and it 
risks generating casualties once real hard problems, such as Polish agriculture 
will be on the table. Furthermore, the acquis can be a burden rather than a 
support wherever institutional underdevelopment and prevalence of informal 
institutions over formal ones are serious. This is merely to say that different 
cases (or countries) require different approaches; more problems require more 
support if there is the political will to bting the task to a successful end for each 
and every applicant country; the acquis must be understood as an end, not an 
instrument and therefore policies should be devised on how to integrate it in 
domestic institutions rather than expect it shape new ones. This requires giving 
up some of the rigid strategy pursued with little success so far and its 
instruments (the famous PHARE program in its present form) and associate with 
other actors and donors (such as the World Bank) in a more problem-centred 
policy approach. This regards especially the building of an accountable, 
transparent and effective judiciary and law enforcement segment in South-
Eastern Europe. No revision of treaties or other inaccessible strategies are 
needed, only a better and daring understanding of assistance strategies. 
Assignment of a specwl border role to South-Eastern European countries 
should be combined with joining forces with NATO in preventing risks and 
potential danger of instability in the region. It was obvious all along that Eastern 
Balkan countries were not ready to join the EU and the process will be lengthy. 
All the more logical, since their task even before joining becomes the 
enforcement of borders is that they should become NATO members. This task 
can be realistically fulfllled before becoming EU members, in 2002. The 
tremendous difference NATO membership would make for borders 
infrastructure (in modernizing airports, highways or bridges, for instance, as it 
did in Turkey or more recently in the Czech Republic) and the training of 
specialized staff does not need to be argued. NATO membership should be 
extended in 2002 at least to all countries on the South-Eastern flank of enlarged 
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Europe.44 It is only realistic to assume that some borders will remain more 
difficult than others, and may remain for a while borders between regions at 
peace (Bulgaria) and regions at war (such as Macedonia). While struggling to 
develop civilian institutions we must also acknowledge some challenges will not 
wait until these countries are ready. 
Extended regional cooperation to the East and the South 
EU-Russia and EU-Ukraine extended cooperation is needed, including allowing 
flexible solutions to allow non-applicants to keep some freedom of travel in 
Eastern Europe. The same solutions should be applied with former Yugoslavian 
countties, going further than the model of the recent EU-Macedonia agreement. 
Not isolation from former Yugoslav countries, but enhanced cooperation and 
investment in regional programs can bring the region back together, a solution 
which had become less unthinkable after the fall of the Milosevic regime at 
Belgrade. Imagining that EU in the present stage or in some near future can by 
itself solve the hard security issues, such as Macedonia, via aid packages and 
lifting trade barriers is an error, however. Securing the South-Eastern and 
Eastern border requires more than it gets presently, and it cannot wait for the 
European defense initiative or other far-fetched solution to come into being but 
needs horizontal cooperation between various agencies. In old times, 
enlightened conquerors were accompanied in their campaigns by merchants and 
artists: Eu:rope' s advance to the East requires this collection of military, police, 
business and institution building groups and none of those by themselves can 
succeed in taming both the Tartars and the West's dread of them. 
Alina Mungiu-Pippidi 
Romanian National School of Government and Administration 
Director of the Romanian Public Policy Center at the Romanian Academic Society 
44 
Zbigniew Brezinski proposed a good arrangement, basically patterned after Helsinki; to 
invite every EU applicant to join NATO in 2002, countries joining at different paces. This 
would allow however NATO to decide where more urgent involvement is needed, such as the 
more vulnerable borders. 
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